Nasser's Rule to the Suez Canal Crisis Revolution of 1952

Being on a wave of pan-Arabism, Nasser became involved in the Yemeni civil war, thus creating tension within the Arab bloc. Saudi Arabia was involved as well, however on the side of the traditionalists. The war proved to be long and costly, in both men and money, but more importantly, it undermined the position of Nasser as the unquestioned leader of the Arab world. According to Mr. Muhammad Riad, at that time, Nasser was struggling at home as well trying to secure his position as the national leader. Many people were disconcerted with Egyptian involvement in the Yemeni war, which yielded more than 10000 dead. Consequently, the opposition was growing in strength and the Muslim Brotherhood, that had been outlawed a few years before, gained significant popularity. The international situation, as well as Nasser's autocratic involvement in Syrian politics resulted in a disintegration of the Union and a further decline in prestige. It was clear that "during the early sixties Nasser's prestige began to decline from its post-Suez peak"(14)

The years 1961-67 can be considered as Nasser's active policies, designed to lead to the restoration of his, and Egypt's, prestige amongst Arabs. His attempts are particularly evident, and significant from the perspective of Arab-Israeli conflict, in his foreign policy. The "most unifying [factor], which no Arab state could keep away from, was that of Israel."(15) In these years, the anti-Israeli propaganda was reaching its apogee, yet gaining even more momentum after Jewish plans for using waters from the Jordan River for irrigation of the Negev desert, at the expense of Arabs. Egypt was the first one to exploit the situation, by calling "a conference in Cairo (in January 1964), attended by traditionalist monarchies and progressive republics alike, in order to consider counter-measures"(16). At this conference the leaders agreed upon setting up the Arab High Command, and giving greater support to Palestinians, were far more important, as far as Arabs and Israelis were concerned. The conference happened to be a success for Nasser since his objectives to "strengthen Arab solidarity"(17) were accomplished.

The Arab High Command was formed under Egyptian leadership, mainly to prevent Israeli attack and to keep Syrians from starting anything on their own. The Command drafted defensive plans in case of escalation of the conflict, but Arabs agreed to "eschew war with Israel."(18) It is a very important fact which indicates that the Arab world, and Egypt in particular were not ready for an escalation of the conflict.

An outcome of the summit that proved to be far-reaching, was a full recognition of the PLO as the Palestinian government-in-exile with its headquarters in Egyptian controlled Gaza. Moreover, Palestinian guerrilla fighters were now promoted to the status of Palestinian soldiers. Locating Palestinian headquarters in Gaza, rather than in the Jordanian-controlled West Bank, implies that the Egyptian leadership identified itself with the Palestinian cause. Another explanation would be that Nasser attempted to exploit this in his plan for restoration of prestige. Consequently, the alignment with the PLO changed and radicalised Egypt's position towards Israel in the years 1966 and 67. However, at the 1965 Casablanca conference, which was to discuss future policy towards Israel "Nasser had to calm [situation] down. Once again his caution and the wish to avoid a confrontation with Israel was accepted by other participants."(19)

In 1964, Egypt and Syria restored the diplomatic links for the ...